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EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS AND PREJUDICE IN THE
DIGITAL AGE: CREATING FACTORS TO PRESERVE THE
BALANCE BETWEEN ATTORNEY AND STATE INTERESTS IN
TRIAL LITIGATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
I. BACKGROUND: COMPETING INTERESTS, SPEECH RESTRICTIONS, 
AND THE TRIAL PUBLICITY RULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
A. Purposes and Balancing of Conflicting Rights. . . . . . . . . 894
1. State Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
2. Attorney Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
3. Balancing Conflicting Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897
B. Rule 3.6 and Extrajudicial Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898
C. The Substantial Likelihood of Prejudice Formulation
in Gentile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
D. Factors Considered in Gentile and Other State 
Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
E. Modern Application in Traditional Media . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
1. Graham v. Weber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
2. United States v. McGregor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
II. APPLICATION OF THE TRADITIONAL RULE ON 
SOCIAL MEDIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
A. Is a Retweet a Statement? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
1. Retweets as Statements—Modern Examples . . . . . . . . . 908
2. Expressive Conduct as Speech—Retweeting 
on Twitter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
B. Substantial Likelihood of Prejudice Analysis in the 
Online World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
1. Modern Examples of Rule 3.6 Applied to Online 
Statements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
2. Different Outcomes Based on the Perceptions of 
Access to Information Online . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
887
888 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:887
3. Limiting Lawyer Speech Online Because of Perceptions
About the Spread of Information Across the Internet . . 915
4. The Reality of Online Access and Distribution . . . . . . . 916
III. ANALYZING NEW TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
A. The Old Factors Are Still Relevant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
B. Perceptions of Intensity and Frequency of Statements 
Must Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
1. Frequency and Intensity in Old Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
2. Frequency and Intensity in New Media. . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
C. New Factors in a New Comment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921
1. Privacy Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921
2. Number of Followers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922
3. Unsolicited Inundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922
4. A Lawyer’s Use of Technology in an Attempt to 
Inundate Nonfollowers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
D. How the New Factors Help . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
IV. ADDRESSING COUNTERARGUMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
A. A Juror May Still See a Lawyer’s Online Statement . . . . 926
B. A Lawyer’s Bad Speech May Not Be Sanctioned . . . . . . . 927
C. This Rule May Limit a Judge’s Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . 928
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929
2020] EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS AND PREJUDICE 889
INTRODUCTION
As social media’s prevalence and usage grows within the United
States, people and organizations capitalize on new media to send
news to users.1 In 2017, 67 percent of people consumed their news
from social media websites, and the rate continues to grow.2 Local
and national news sources bring newsworthy stories to active users
on social media sites such as Twitter, where users can communicate
and interact with one another to promote ideas and spread informa-
tion.3 These online accounts cover not only mundane, day-to-day
news, but also salacious stories relating to civil and criminal
lawsuits.4
In April 2018, attorney Neal Katyal used his Twitter account to
advocate for his client leading up to oral argument before the
Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii.5 Katyal posted personal
statements voicing his opinion about the case and retweeted posts
linking to news articles and amicus briefs that supported his
1. See, e.g., Jacob Kastrenakes, Twitter Will Live Stream Local Broadcasts During
Breaking News Events, VERGE (Feb. 15, 2018, 11:55 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/15/
17016434/twitter-local-news-broadcasts-breaking-events [https://perma.cc/EPG4-ZMEB]; see
also Elizabeth Thornburg, Twitter and the #So-CalledJudge, 71 SMU L. REV. 249, 298-99, 302
(2018).
2. Elisa Shearer & Jeffrey Gottfried, News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2017, PEW
RES. CTR. (Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.journalism.org/2017/09/07/news-use-across-social-media-
platforms-2017/ [https://perma.cc/Y4NG-58HC]; see also Jefferey Ogden Katz & Alexander I.
Passo, Attorneys, the Internet, and Hate Speech: An Argument for an Amended Model Rule 8.4,
13 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 65, 68 (2014).
3. See, e.g., Montgomery County DA (@MontcopaDA), TWITTER (Apr. 26, 2018, 10:48 AM),
https://twitter.com/MontcopaDA/status/989561953558331394 [https://perma.cc/RP4G-8ET8];
see also Katz & Passo, supra note 2, at 66-67; Thornburg, supra note 1, at 254; Our Values,
TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/en_us/values.html [https://perma.cc/98FH-7VZ2] (“We
believe in free expression and think every voice has the power to impact the world.”).
4. See, e.g., Emma Bazilian, Casey Anthony Trial Blows Up Social Media, ADWEEK (July
6, 2011), https://www.adweek.com/digital/casey-anthony-trial-blows-social-media-133198/
[https://perma.cc/4TR2-M77A] (“[T]here were 325,283 Twitter posts on Tuesday about the
Casey Anthony trial.”); Walter Pacheco, Casey Anthony Trial: Social Media Revolutionized
Coverage, ORLANDO SENTINEL (July 5, 2011, 9:01 PM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/
news/orange/os-casey-anthony-twitter-facebook-20110704-story.html [https://perma.cc/9M7L-
2TSA] (“[T]he keywords ‘caseyanthony’ were used 34,000 times and ‘notguilty’ appeared
20,000 times an hour after the ... not-guilty verdict.”).
5. See infra note 6 and accompanying text. See generally Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct.
2392, 2405 (2018).
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argument.6 With nearly 284,000 followers,7 many people could view
and perceive the arguments Katyal would make at oral argument.
Katyal’s persistent tweeting enabled him to have “extra” argument
time in the court of public opinion, as advocates are allowed only a
specific number of minutes to argue before the Supreme Court.8
Attorneys also post statements on Twitter referring to criminal
cases when an alleged offender stands trial for a crime in a local
venue.9 Scholars and practitioners voice additional concerns about
an attorney’s extrajudicial statements made during criminal trials
in local venues because laypeople serve on juries.10 The media’s
publishing of a lawyer’s out-of-court comment could prejudice jurors
6. See, e.g., Neal Katyal (@neal_katyal), TWITTER (Apr. 24, 2018, 3:25 PM),
https://twitter.com/neal_katyal/status/988906774827761665 [https://perma.cc/GDQ4-T5AL]
(“The backgrounds and perspectives of those articulating arguments against the travel ban
in #TrumpvHawaii are remarkable.... Their chorus is deafening: the ban is unconstitutional,
unprecedented, unnecessary and un-American.”); Neal Katyal (@neal_katyal), TWITTER (Apr.
9, 2018, 6:30 PM), https://twitter.com/neal_katyal/status/983517554508468224 [https://
perma.cc/9JHJ-SGRF] (“I’ll be arguing the travel ban case .... An impt [sic] facet is the huge
number of amicus ... briefs.... I’ll highlight 1 brief every day until then.”); Neal Katyal
(@neal_katyal), TWITTER (Apr. 3, 2018, 6:59 AM), https://twitter.com/neal_katyal/status/
981169418330767368 [https://perma.cc/8BSN-PC4G] (linking to Reuters article and stating
“Snubbing Trump DOJ, Big Law firms back Hawaii amici in SCOTUS travel ban case”).
7. Neal Katyal (@neal_katyal), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/neal_katyal [https://perma.
cc/AGT5-PPBW].
8. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 75, Trump, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965); OT2017
#2: “Who is the River Master?”, FIRST MONDAYS (Oct. 9, 2017, 50:15), http://www.firstmondays.
fm/episodes/2017/10/9/ot2017-2-who-is-the-river-master [https://perma.cc/E5JG-DDCW] (sug-
gesting that the online podcasts are media that advocates use to explain arguments they did
not have time to make at oral argument); see also The Court and Its Procedures, U.S. SUP. CT.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/procedures.aspx [https://perma.cc/3WHY-M2J2] (“With
rare exceptions, each side is allowed 30 minutes argument.”).
9. See, e.g., Kaitlyn Foti, Judge Rejects Cosby Request to Disqualify DA Kevin Steele from
Case, TIMES CHRON. (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.montgomerynews.com/timeschronicle/news/
judge-rejects-cosby-request-to-disqualify-da-kevin-steele-from/article_78560945-4452-5f76-
94f4-d0a20c69b9d8.html [https://perma.cc/89CZ-TMC4]; Anna Massoglia, Why Are Lawyers
and Judges Still Tweeting About Trial?, LAWYERIST.COM (Mar. 10, 2016), https://lawyerist.
com/lawyers-and-judges-tweeting-trial/ [https://perma.cc/TM7P-M2YU] (DA retweeting a
Rolling Stone article that implicates guilt of defendant Bill Cosby).
10. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991); In re Hinds, 449 A.2d
483, 489 (N.J. 1982); Mattei Radu, The Difficult Task of Model Rule of Professional Conduct
3.6: Balancing the Free Speech Rights of Lawyers, the Sixth Amendment Rights of Criminal
Defendants, and Society’s Right to the Fair Administration of Justice, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV.
497, 513 (2007).
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before and during a trial.11 Because of this concern, the American
Bar Association (ABA) enacted Model Rule of Professional Conduct
3.6 (Rule 3.6), which attempts to limit the types of speech attorneys
can make while involved in litigation.12
Although a state seeks to protect a criminal defendant’s right to
a fair trial and its own interest in the fair administration of
justice,13 courts and disciplinary boards must balance these
interests against an attorney’s First Amendment free speech right
when determining whether an attorney has violated Rule 3.6.14
Comment 1 to Rule 3.6 notes that a lawyer’s statements have value,
as a lawyer is often in the best position to disseminate pertinent
case-related information to the public.15 Attorneys may need to
release this information to expose government abuse, ensure that
citizens remain safe, or promote discussions about changing public
policy.16 To effectively balance these rights, the standard described
in Rule 3.6 requires courts and disciplinary boards17 to consider
various factors in determining whether an attorney’s statement
results in a “substantial likelihood of prejudice” to the proceeding.18
By requiring courts to consider the factors, the ABA and the
adopting states ensure that the rule is narrowly tailored to protect
11. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966); Hinds, 449
A.2d at 489-90, 496.
12. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). The Model Rules and
ABA advisory opinions are not binding on state proceedings. See Cheryl B. Preston, Lawyers’
Abuse of Technology, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 879, 884, 888 (2018). However, most states have
ethical codes that are similar or identical to the ABA Model Rules. Id. at 884 & n.10.
13. See Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975); Hinds, 449
A.2d at 490, 494.
14. See Hinds, 449 A.2d at 489 (asserting that an attorney’s right to free speech is not
absolute, but that the interest must still be acknowledged throughout a proceeding); see also
Bauer, 522 F.2d at 250.
15. See r. 3.6 cmt. 1.
16. See Bauer, 522 F.2d at 250; r. 3.6 cmt. 1.
17. This Note is primarily focused on a court’s interpretation of Rule 3.6. It is important
to note that decision makers of a state bar’s disciplinary board often must interpret the rule
to make an initial sanctions determination. These decision makers, too, would benefit from
this Note’s proposal.
18. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1044 (1991) (time of statement);
Bauer, 522 F.2d at 256-58 (nature of the proceeding); r. 3.6 cmt. 6 (nature of the proceeding);
see also r. 3.6(b)-(c) (listing specific statements an attorney may make during trial).
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as much attorney speech as possible while still promoting state and
defendant interests.19
For over thirty years, these factors have enabled decision makers
to balance these rights effectively when faced with attorney
statements published in traditional media outlets.20 Yet in a new
age of Internet communication and social media, the original factors
noted in the ABA rule and comments do not sufficiently protect
attorney speech posted on online forums.21 This Note argues that a
new technological-focused comment to Rule 3.6 will remedy this
problem.
In today’s online world, scholars and practitioners constantly
remind attorneys to take caution when posting statements online,
because confidential and inappropriate information will spread
across the web and reach large numbers of people at accelerated
speeds.22 With this perception prevalent within the legal commu-
nity, a judge—ruling on a case involving attorney statements made
on social media—could find that there is a substantial likelihood
that the online statements will prejudice a trial.23
Although Internet communications and social media outlets give
users the opportunity to spread information to more people at faster
rates,24 it does not necessarily follow that all attorney statements
posted online about litigation will be seen by potential jurors within
the court’s jurisdiction. Numerous factors make it less likely that a
potential juror will see an online statement, including the attorney’s
social media account privacy settings, the attorney’s number of
followers, the functions the attorney uses on a specific medium to
19. See Katz & Passo, supra note 2, at 83-84, 87-88.
20. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1037-38; United States v. McGregor, 838 F. Supp. 2d 1256,
1264-65 (M.D. Ala. 2012).
21. See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. Other authors have made similar
arguments about an attorney’s use of social media altering the balance between a lawyer’s
speech rights and the state’s interest in the fair administration of justice. See, e.g., Emily
Anne Vance, Note, Should Prosecutors Blog, Post, or Tweet?: The Need for New Restraints in
Light of Social Media, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 367, 406 (2015). However, other authors noted
that the advancement of social media technologies required increased limitations on lawyers’
speech. See id. This Note argues that additional factors must be implemented to better protect
a lawyers’ speech rights on social media.
22. See Katz & Passo, supra note 2, at 67; Preston, supra note 12, at 893, 898-99.
23. See, e.g., Jackson v. Deen, No. CV412-139, 2013 WL 1911445, at *3, n.11 (S.D. Ga.
May 8, 2013); United States v. Koubriti, 305 F. Supp. 2d 723, 738 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
24. Thornburg, supra note 1, at 257-58.
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make a statement more searchable, and the ability of a potential
juror to be inundated with statements from nonfollowers.25
This Note argues that by creating a new, additional comment to
Rule 3.6 that lists the factors to consider when faced with an
attorney’s social media statement, judges will be in a better position
to determine if an attorney’s statement reaches and prejudices a
jury. The inclusion of such factors can aid decision makers who may
be unfamiliar with how attorneys can protect information on social
media.26 The new considerations, designed for a new age of social
media use, can help shift back into place the balancing of rights that
judges have achieved when applying the rule to statements
presented in traditional media.
In applying Rule 3.6 to social media statements, a judge must
first understand how courts have applied Rule 3.6 to traditional
media statements and the factors that make traditional media
statements different from social media statements.27 Part I dis-
cusses Rule 3.6 and explains how courts apply the rule to state-
ments that lawyers make in traditional-media outlets. Part II
describes the problems that derive from a judge’s application of Rule
3.6 to statements lawyers make online. Part III lists and describes
new factors for a judge to consider when ruling on a case that
involves an attorney’s social media statements. Using these factors,
a judge achieves a better balance between an attorney’s speech
interests and a state’s interest in obtaining fair and just proceed-
ings.28 Lastly, Part IV analyzes counterarguments and assures
readers that new factors will not unjustly promote lawyer speech
interests at the expense of state interests.
25. See infra Part III.
26. Judges may be unfamiliar with how information spreads on social media, or the
precautions users take to prevent dissemination of statements on social media, because many
judges do not have social media accounts. See Stephen Dillard, It’s Time for Judges to Tweet,
Like, and Share, A.B.A. (Oct. 20, 2017), https://abaforlawstudents.com/2017/10/20/time-for-
judges-to-use-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/4HPP-HMPX] (noting that many judges do not
have social media accounts because they consider their roles as neutral arbiters to limit their
abilities to have a significant presence as public figures). But see Thornburg, supra note 1, at
258-62, 264 (listing prominent judges who have Twitter accounts, and advocating for judges
to use social media outlets to promote transparency).
27. See infra Parts I-III.
28. See infra Part III.
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I. BACKGROUND: COMPETING INTERESTS, SPEECH RESTRICTIONS,
AND THE TRIAL PUBLICITY RULE
Before reviewing the history and legal standards of Rule 3.6, one
must understand the purpose of the rule.
A. Purposes and Balancing of Conflicting Rights
Rule 3.6 seeks to balance conflicting interests: an attorney’s right
to free speech, a state’s interest in the fair administration of justice,
and a defendant’s right to a fair trial in a criminal proceeding.29
Each interest and right serves an important function for democracy
and the American justice system.
1. State Interests
When applying Rule 3.6, judges must consider state interests,
such as the fair administration of justice and a defendant’s right to
a fair trial.30 A court must ensure that a judicial proceeding is fair.31
Additionally, a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right requires that a
defendant be given a fair trial.32 A fair trial is “the most fundamen-
tal of all freedoms,”33 and is “particularly acute in the criminal
context” in which a defendant’s physical liberty is at stake.34
Because of the high stakes, a jury must ascertain the truth and
reach the correct determination based solely on admissible evidence
presented at trial.35
29. See In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 489 (N.J. 1982); Radu, supra note 10, at 497; Vance,
supra note 21, at 372; see also U.S. CONST. amends. I, VI.
30. Other interests include preserving public confidence in the judiciary and maintaining
the integrity of the profession. See Katz & Passo, supra note 2, at 83-84. However, these
interests are protected by other Model Rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.1-8.5
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
31. See Hinds, 449 A.2d at 489.
32. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Hinds, 449 A.2d at 490.
33. Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975) (citing Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965)).
34. Hinds, 449 A.2d at 490.
35. Id.; Radu, supra note 10, at 513.
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Jurors should be impartial and know little about a case before a
trial begins.36 For these reasons, professional rules limit the amount
of influence out-of-court statements have on trial participants to
prevent frustrating the functions of the jury and the adversarial
system.37 An attorney’s extrajudicial statements may potentially
influence jurors and other participants who actively contribute to
ongoing litigation.38 By acquiring knowledge about a case that is not
in a public record or presented in the courtroom, the public could be
misled by the statements, a juror could become biased, or the jury
could find the defendant guilty based on grounds that were not
presented at trial.39 The information could impair the jury’s
ultimate factfinding mission and “wreck the intricate machinery of
the criminal justice system.”40 Additionally, the risk of harm may
increase when an attorney makes statements to the press because
an attorney holds great influence that could cause a juror to accept
that statement as reliable and true.41
2. Attorney Interests
The competing interest Rule 3.6 recognizes is an attorney’s
freedom of expression.42 Even while participating in the legal
profession, attorneys as U.S. citizens “are entitled to the ... protec-
tion of the First Amendment.”43 The drafters of Rule 3.6 recognized
this when writing comment 1, which states that “there are vital
social interests served by the free dissemination of information
about ... legal proceedings .... [The public] has a legitimate interest
in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of
general public concern.”44 Further, the comment states that “the
36. See Radu, supra note 10, at 513.
37. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
38. See Hinds, 449 A.2d at 494; see also Vance, supra note 21, at 370.
39. See Vance, supra note 21, at 370.
40. Hinds, 449 A.2d at 494.
41. See id. at 489 (recognizing an attorney’s “special status” as an officer of the court);
Radu, supra note 10, at 531 (citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1044, 1074
(1991)).
42. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
43. Hinds, 449 A.2d at 489.
44. R. 3.6 cmt. 1.
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subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in
debate and deliberation over questions of public policy.”45
By speaking about litigation, lawyers keep government officials
accountable and aid in increasing safety, governmental transpar-
ency, and debate about public policy.46 A lawyer’s statement made
during litigation facilitates these goals, as a lawyer will already
have the public’s attention when the media covers the alleged crime
and trial.47
Additionally, defense attorneys are obligated to zealously
advocate for their clients.48 Lawyers are skilled in giving voice to
their clients’ cases by disputing misconceptions and discouraging
speculation.49 Based on negative information found in public records
or statements made by the prosecution during a press conference,
the public may already presume the accused is guilty of the alleged
crime.50 A defense attorney must be able to counter presumptions of
guilt by portraying the defendant’s innocence to the press and
citizens within the jurisdiction.51
Some scholars contend that attorneys automatically waive their
free speech rights when joining the legal profession, suggesting that
any balancing between a lawyer’s right to free expression and a
defendant’s right to a fair trial will always weigh in favor of
defendant and state interests.52 This simply is not the case.
Although an attorney may be subject to more speech restrictions
than a nonattorney citizen, attorneys still retain rights to free
expression that “cannot be restricted unless certain conditions
apply.”53 Traditionally, when a government regulation directly
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. See Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 250 (7th Cir. 1975).
48. See Radu, supra note 10, at 531.
49. Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, The “Friend”ly Lawyer: Professionalism and Ethical
Considerations of the Use of Social Networking During Litigation, 24 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
127, 129 (2013).
50. See Bauer, 522 F.2d at 250.
51. See id.
52. Preston, supra note 12, at 891-92 (“Attorneys knowingly and willingly enter into a
highly regulated profession, implicitly waiving the right to ... expression.”).
53. Katz & Passo, supra note 2, at 83. The Court’s statement in Gentile v. State Bar of
Nevada that “during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to ‘free speech’ an attorney has is
extremely circumscribed,” shows that the Court does acknowledge an attorney’s right to free
speech. 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991); see also id. at 1082 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“This does
2020] EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS AND PREJUDICE 897
prescribes what a person may and may not say, courts must
determine whether the state has a compelling interest in restricting
speech and whether the rule regulating the speech is narrowly
tailored to achieve the state interest.54 As described above, the
interests implicated when attempting to limit an attorney’s
extrajudicial statements are sufficiently important to warrant
regulation.55 The question thus becomes, is “this disciplinary rule ...
broader than necessary or essential to protect [the] governmental
interest.”56
3. Balancing Conflicting Interests
In considering whether state variations of Rule 3.6 are suffi-
ciently tailored, courts must determine whether the regulations are
too vague or too broad.57 The language of Rule 3.6 and the subse-
quent comments provide great detail so that lawyers may recognize
the types of speech they can express in a public forum, the standard
of review the court will apply, and the factors a court will consider
when determining whether a statement is likely to prejudice a
proceeding.58 The detailed language of the rule suggests that, in
traditional media, courts can strike an appropriate balance between
conflicting rights because the only speech prohibited is that which
is “necessary” or “essential” to protect the fair administration of
justice and the right to a fair trial.59
However, as discussed below, with the rise of social media
technologies, the factors and exceptions listed in Rule 3.6 no longer
not mean, of course, that lawyers forfeit their First Amendment rights.”); In re Hinds, 449
A.2d 483, 489 (N.J. 1982) (“Like other citizens, attorneys are entitled to the full protection of
the First Amendment.”); cf. Thornburg, supra note 1, at 297 (“Judges do not forfeit the right
to freedom of speech when they assume office. They do agree, however, that the right must
be balanced against the public’s legitimate expectations of judicial impartiality.” (quoting In
re Sanders, 955 P.2d 369, 370 (Wash. 1998) (en banc))).
54. See Katz & Passo, supra note 2, at 75.
55. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
56. Hinds, 449 A.2d at 490.
57. See Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 249, 251 (7th Cir. 1975) (noting
that lawyers must be aware of prohibited areas of speech and stating that a rule cannot
prohibit more speech than necessary to protect the other right at stake).
58. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6(a)-(c) cmts. 3, 5-7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
59. See id.
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effectively protect a lawyer’s speech rights.60 Thus, the rule permits
courts to unjustly tip the balance in favor of the state interests and
prohibit more speech than necessary to prevent jury prejudice.61 Yet
before reviewing the faults of Rule 3.6, one must understand how
courts have traditionally regulated a lawyer’s extrajudicial speech.
B. Rule 3.6 and Extrajudicial Statements
Model Rule 3.6(a) provides:
A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investi-
gation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial
statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will
be disseminated by means of public communication and will
have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
adjudicative proceeding in the matter.62
For this rule to apply, a person must (1) be a lawyer, who (2)
participates in the litigation, and (3) makes a statement that he or
she (4) knows or should know will be released to a public audience,
and (5) the public statement must be substantially likely to
prejudice the outcome of a trial or the jury venire.63 In past extraju-
dicial statement cases involving traditional media, lawyers have
mostly disputed the “substantial likelihood of material prejudice”
element.64 As discussed below, with the advancement of social-
media technologies, attorneys may contest additional elements.65
The American Bar Association began regulating pretrial pub-
licity in 1908 by enacting Canon 20 of the Canons of Professional
60. See infra Parts II-III.
61. See infra Parts II-III.
62. R. 3.6(a). For more information about presumed prejudicial and nonprejudicial
communications, see r. 3.6(b) cmt. 5.
63. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991); r. 3.6(a); Radu, supra note
10, at 517.
64. See, e.g., Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1036; Graham v. Weber, No. CIV13-4100, 2015 WL
5797857, at *8-9 (D.S.D. Oct. 5, 2015). However, some cases have disputed other factors,
including whether an attorney is a participant of the ongoing investigation or litigation. See
In re Goode, 821 F.3d 553, 557-58 (5th Cir. 2016); In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 496-97 (N.J.
1982).
65. See infra Part II.A.
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Ethics.66 The ABA intended for the 1908 rule to deter lawyers from
speaking to the press; however, such deterrence was minimal
because courts rarely enforced the rule.67 After the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy and the subsequent murder of the
assassin Lee Harvey Oswald, the Warren Commission analyzed the
media’s coverage of the J.F.K. assassination and suggested that if
Lee Harvey Oswald had never been killed, he likely would not have
received a fair trial due to the widespread media coverage following
the assassination.68 After assessing the Warren Commission’s
concerns, the ABA House of Delegates revised the extrajudicial
statement ethical rule and used a “reasonable likelihood of preju-
dice” standard to determine whether a court could restrict a lawyer’s
speech.69 In 1969, the ABA incorporated the rule into its newly
formed Model Code of Professional Responsibility.70
Many states incorporated this model rule into their own state
codes of conduct, and federal and state courts began ruling on
whether the “reasonable likelihood” standard passed constitutional
muster.71 Some courts found that the low standard prohibited too
much attorney speech and ruled that decision makers use a “clear
and present danger” test to determine whether a lawyer’s speech
prejudiced a jury.72 As a result of these cases, the ABA Task Force
on Fair Trial and Free Press drafted new language codifying an
“imminent threat” standard; however, the ABA House of Delegates
never approved the change.73
Rather, in 1983, the ABA codified the “substantial likelihood of
material[ ] prejudic[e]” standard when it issued its Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and implemented Model Rule 3.6.74 Practitio-
ners and scholars viewed the standard as a middle ground, attempt-
ing to split the difference between jurisdictions that were using the
66. Radu, supra note 10, at 499.
67. Id. at 499-500 (explaining that judges determined the rule was too vague for
enforcement).
68. Id. at 500.
69. Id. at 503-04 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 505.
71. Id. at 505-06.
72. In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 492 (N.J. 1982); Radu, supra note 10, at 506.
73. Radu, supra note 10, at 508-09.
74. Id. at 509 (emphasis added).
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“reasonable likelihood” and “imminent threat” standards.75 Thirty-
one states immediately codified Rule 3.6, and practitioners began
challenging the constitutionality of the rule.76 One Nevada case,
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, reached the Supreme Court in
1991.77
C. The Substantial Likelihood of Prejudice Formulation in Gentile
The Supreme Court found that Nevada’s “substantial likelihood”
standard was constitutional in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada.78
There, the defendant’s lawyer, Dominic Gentile, spoke at a press
conference after his client was indicted on criminal charges.79
Gentile said that his client was innocent of all charges.80 He then
described his strategy for arguing the case at trial, noting specific
pieces of evidence that placed guilt on other suspects.81 The jury
acquitted Gentile’s client at trial six months later.82 The Nevada
State Bar filed a complaint against Gentile for violating Nevada’s
rule of professional conduct.83 Gentile was sanctioned, and as a
result, he filed a claim stating the rule’s “substantial likelihood of
prejudice” standard was unconstitutional.84 The Court ultimately
ruled that Nevada’s substantial likelihood standard was the
appropriate standard to use in the case; the Court then found in
favor of Gentile by holding that his statements were not substan-
tially likely to prejudice a jury.85
In the opinion, the Justices noted that the substantial likelihood
standard is an effective standard to use because the rule, if
“[i]nterpreted in a proper and narrow manner,” can “prevent an
attorney ... from releasing information of grave prejudice on the eve
75. Id.; see also Hinds, 449 A.2d at 492.
76. Radu, supra note 10, at 509; see Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1036-37
(1991).
77. See 501 U.S. at 1030.
78. Id. at 1036.
79. See id. at 1033.
80. Id. at 1059 app. a.
81. Id. at 1060 app. a.
82. Id. at 1033.
83. Id. Nevada’s extrajudicial statement rule was “almost identical to” the then-existing
ABA Model Rule 3.6. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 1037-38.
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of jury selection.”86 The rule, therefore, is meant only to prohibit
attorney speech that causes “substantial harm.”87
Courts and practitioners have interpreted the “substantial
likelihood of prejudice” standard in different ways. For example, the
Oregon State Bar considers prejudice to be substantial when it is
“highly probable” and when there is a “likelihood of materiality.”88
The Oregon State Bar further describes substantiality as “denot[ing]
a material matter of clear and weighty importance.”89 Some courts
note that the state must have clear and convincing evidence that the
attorney’s statements truly jeopardized the fairness of a trial.90 In
determining whether evidence is clear and convincing, a court
cannot sanction an attorney based on a “vague feeling that his
statement could possibly, or even foreseeably, have affected the
trial.”91 Although some state bar associations and courts appear to
protect much attorney speech, other courts consider the substantial
likelihood standard to be lower, and do not require a showing of
actual prejudice.92
States have interpreted the “substantial likelihood” standard in
multiple ways;93 however, the Court in Gentile was not concerned
with differentiating between these interpretations, or the three
standards that the ABA proposed and courts used throughout the
twentieth century.94 Although the Court upheld the “middle ground”
standard, the Court noted that “[t]he difference between the
requirement of serious and imminent threat ... and the more
common formulation of substantial likelihood of material prejudice
could prove mere semantics.”95 Rather, courts point to a review of
86. Id. at 1036.
87. Id.
88. Or. State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. No. 2007-179, 519 (2007).
89. Id. at 521 (quoting OR. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT 1.0(o) (2007)).
90. In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 495 (N.J. 1982).
91. Id. at 500 (Pashman, J., concurring).
92. See In re Brizzi, 962 N.E.2d 1240, 1245 (Ind. 2012) (noting that a judge must ask
whether the statement could cause prejudice, rather than whether the statement actually
caused prejudice).
93. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
94. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1037 (1991); see also supra notes 72-76
and accompanying text.
95. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1037; see Hinds, 449 A.2d at 493 (majority opinion) (“The clear and
present danger standard is no more self-defining or self-revealing than are any of these
alternative formulations.”).
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the rule’s factors as the most important determination in deciding
whether an attorney has violated Rule 3.6.96
D. Factors Considered in Gentile and Other State Proceedings
In Gentile, the Court noted that certain factors should be
considered when determining whether an attorney’s statements
substantially prejudiced the jury venire.97 In analyzing Gentile’s
intent, the Court stated that Gentile did not intend to sway the
jurors’ opinions before trial.98 The Court also noted that time was an
important factor to consider when determining prejudicial impact.99
The Court stated that Gentile’s statement was less likely to reach
“the attention of the venire on the eve of voir dire” because Gentile
spoke to the press six months before trial when his client was first
indicted.100
Another factor the Court considered was the size of the commu-
nity.101 In considering this factor, the Court noted that in a jurisdic-
tion that included over 600,000 potential jurors, the attorney’s
statements were less likely to prejudice a jury because the defense
attorney and prosecutor likely could find twelve jurors out of
600,000 who had not been exposed to the press release.102 Addition-
ally, the Court stated that television news stations and newspapers
only broadcasted and published a small portion of the attorney’s
remarks.103 By applying these factors to the case, the Court
determined that the attorney’s remarks did not have a substantial
likelihood of prejudicing the jury or the jury venire.104
Lower courts and state bars have also applied these factors (time
and size of community) to their cases and have added factors
(frequency, intensity, likelihood of admissibility, and nature of the
proceeding) to determine whether an attorney should be sanctioned
for his or her speech. One federal district court considered the
96. Hinds, 449 A.2d at 493.
97. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1042, 1044-45.
98. See id. at 1042.
99. Id. at 1044.
100. Id. 
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1045.
104. See id. at 1037-38.
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frequency and intensity of the attorney’s statements when deter-
mining whether they were substantially likely to be prejudicial.105
Similarly, the State Bar of Pennsylvania considered the likelihood
of admissibility at trial in its determination of prejudice.106 The
nature of a proceeding also plays a role in a decision maker’s
determination of prejudice.107 By applying these factors on a case-by-
case basis, decision makers have effectively weighed an attorney’s
free speech interest against the state’s interest in the fair adminis-
tration of justice by only prohibiting speech that is truly likely to
prejudice a trial.
E. Modern Application in Traditional Media
In 1991, the Court effectively balanced lawyers’ speech against
state interests to ensure both rights were protected.108 Courts
continue to implement the substantial likelihood of prejudice
standard and use the Gentile factors.109 By applying the Gentile rule
and factors in Graham v. Weber110 and United States v. McGregor,111
courts effectively balanced the rights of the involved parties in
instances where lawyers made statements to traditional media
sources.
1. Graham v. Weber
In the context of traditional media, courts protect a lawyer’s
speech by considering the Gentile factors and applying the substan-
tial likelihood standard. For example, in Graham v. Weber, the court
found that the Attorney General’s statements about a murder case
were not substantially likely to prejudice the defendant’s criminal
proceeding.112 After a jury convicted John Graham of murder,
105. United States v. McGregor, 838 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1265 (M.D. Ala. 2012).
106. Pa. Bar Ass’n, Informal Ethics Op. 96-45, *3 (1996).
107. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019); see Chi. Council
of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 256-58 (7th Cir. 1975).
108. See supra Part I.C.
109. See Graham v. Weber, No. CIV13-4100, 2015 WL 5797857, at *13-15, *21-26 (D.S.D.
Oct. 5, 2015); McGregor, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 1264-65.
110. 2015 WL 5797857, at *21.
111. 838 F. Supp. 2d at 1265.
112. 2015 WL 5797857, at *8.
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Graham filed numerous habeas corpus petitions.113 While one
habeas corpus action was pending, the Attorney General gave
presentations at a university and benefit fundraiser where he talked
about the case and the defendant’s suspected involvement in
another murder.114 Due to the continued national interest in the
case, newspapers published statements from the Attorney General’s
presentations.115
The defendant sought a court-issued gag order to prohibit the
Attorney General from speaking further about the case during the
defendant’s habeas corpus petition.116 To issue a gag order, the court
first had to review Rule 3.6 and Gentile to determine whether the
attorney’s statements were substantially likely to prejudice the
proceeding.117 In applying the Gentile factors, the court found that
the statements were not likely to prejudice the proceeding.118 First,
in reviewing the nature of the proceeding, the court noted a judge,
rather than a jury, would decide the defendant’s habeas corpus
claim; this reduced the potential for prejudice because a judge is in
a better position to remain impartial.119 Additionally, the court
considered timing when determining whether the statements would
likely prejudice a jury venire of a potential new trial.120 The court
noted that since there was no jury or jury venire to be considered at
that time (because the habeas corpus petition was still under
review), there was no pressing, substantial likelihood of prejudicing
that future jury.121
Ultimately, when the court balanced the defendant’s right to a
fair proceeding against the lawyer’s right to free speech, the court
held that the lawyer’s speech right must be upheld because the
113. See id. at *1.
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. Id. Plaintiffs often name attorneys general as defendants in habeas corpus actions.
Federal Habeas Corpus Review, FINDLAW, https://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/
federal-habeas-corpus-review.html [https://perma.cc/VF2Y-JWRG]. Thus, attorneys general
participate in litigation and are susceptible to Rule 3.6. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
r. 3.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
117. Graham, 2015 WL 5797857, at *4, *8. South Dakota’s Rule 3.6 “closely tracks” the
ABA’s Model Rule 3.6. Id. at *4.
118. Id. at *8.
119. Id. at *9.
120. Id. at *9-10.
121. Id.
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lawyer’s statement enabled the public, who had a “legitimate
interest in the functioning of its criminal justice system,” to become
educated on the topic.122 By using the factors described above, the
court effectively balanced the rights of the parties and allowed the
attorney’s nonprejudicial speech to benefit the public.123
2. United States v. McGregor
Using the Gentile factors, courts can protect attorney speech in
traditional media outlets; likewise, the Gentile factors enable courts
to proscribe lawyers’ speech when statements are substantially
likely to prejudice a jury. For example, in United States v.
McGregor, the court stated that the defense attorney’s statements
made during the defendant’s first trial likely prejudiced the
proceeding.124
In that case, multiple defendants, including state senators and
casino owners, were charged with bribing officials to vote for a bill
that would enact a referendum on the legalization of electronic
bingo.125 During the first trial, the court granted McGregor a new
trial due to a hung jury determination on some of his charges.126
During the second trial, the prosecution filed a motion to implement
a gag order against the parties to prevent them from consistently
speaking to the press, as was done in the first trial.127 Ultimately,
the court held that a gag order was unnecessary because both
attorneys were subject to Alabama’s Rule 3.6, which “mirrors”
Model Rule 3.6.128
Yet, in arriving at the ultimate conclusion that a gag order was
unnecessary because less restrictive means of limiting attorney
speech were possible,129 the court first had to consider the “substan-
tial likelihood of material prejudice” standard and the Gentile
factors to determine whether the attorney’s comments were
122. Id. at *10.
123. See id. at *9-10.
124. 838 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1265 (M.D. Ala. 2012).
125. Id. at 1258.
126. Id. at 1259.
127. Id. at 1260.
128. Id. at 1263, 1267.
129. See id. at 1267.
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permissible.130 Although the court found the defense attorney’s
statements nonprejudicial in the second trial, the court found that
the defense attorney’s statements made during the first trial were
substantially likely to prejudice a jury.131 In analyzing the defense’s
extrajudicial statements, the court considered the timing, frequency,
context, and intensity of the attorney’s statements.132
The timing of the defense’s statements increased the likelihood
that the statements would prejudice the jury because the defense
attorney spoke to the press on multiple days during the trial on the
courthouse steps.133 There, the attorney speculated about the
prosecution’s witnesses and denounced those witnesses’ credibility
by stating “God himself” could not rehabilitate them.134 The court
noted that the context of the comments, arising from opinion rather
than fact, combined with the frequency and intensity of the
statements, made it far more likely that a jury would become aware
of and influenced by the defense attorney’s statements.135
By applying the Gentile factors to their gag-order analysis, the
court suggested that the defense attorney would be responsible
under Rule 3.6 if the government were to file charges against the
attorney for the extrajudicial statements made during McGregor’s
first trial.136 Such a ruling would strike an effective balance between
the defense attorney’s First Amendment rights and the govern-
ment’s interest in a fair and just trial.137
By reviewing these two cases that protect a lawyer’s right to free
speech and the fair administration of justice, it becomes more
apparent that courts can effectively balance the rights of the parties
when applying the Gentile standard and factors to extrajudicial
statements made in traditional media.
130. Id. at 1263-64.
131. See id. at 1265.
132. Id. at 1259, 1264-66.
133. See id. at 1259.
134. Id. at 1264-66.
135. Id. at 1265-66.
136. See id. at 1265 (“[T]he government satisfied the prejudice prong of the Gentile test.”).
137. See id. at 1267.
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II. APPLICATION OF THE TRADITIONAL RULE ON SOCIAL MEDIA
As technologies advance, courts must apply Rule 3.6 and the
Gentile factors to online statements.138 Scholars and practitioners
have suggested that courts may continue applying the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct as they are currently written, without
modification.139 Comment 8 to Rule 1.1 notes that the ABA Model
Rules apply when an attorney posts online.140 The comment states
that a lawyer is responsible for understanding current technologies
in order to provide competent counsel to clients and maintain
ethical obligations.141 Further, the ABA has reminded practitioners
that Rule 3.6, specifically, applies to blog posts.142 ABA Opinion 480
suggests that courts can apply Rule 3.6 to online statements in the
exact same way that courts apply the rule to statements published
in traditional media.143 Yet there are several differences between
statements made on social media and traditional media that suggest
new factors must be implemented to gain an effective balance
between lawyer and state interests in an online setting.144 Courts
must consider additional factors to keep an effective balance
between attorney and state interests.145
A. Is a Retweet a Statement?
In traditional media, practitioners and courts mostly analyze the
“substantial likelihood of prejudice” element of Rule 3.6.146 Howev-
er, as statements are created on online media, new issues may arise.
In a world where attorneys “retweet” and “like” content created by
138. See, e.g., In re Goode, 821 F.3d 553, 556-57, 560-61 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v.
Silver, 103 F. Supp. 3d 370, 374-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); State v. Polk, 415 S.W.3d 692, 694-96
(Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
139. Shannon Awsumb & Hon. Karen Wells Roby, The Intersection of Online
Communications and Legal Ethics, FED. LAW., Aug. 2012, at 33.
140. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
141. Id.; see, e.g., ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 466, 5-6
(2014).
142. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 480, 6 (2018).
143. See id.
144. See infra Part II.B.
145. See infra Part III.C.
146. See supra Part I.D.
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other social media users, practitioners must first ask a threshold
question to determine if Rule 3.6 even applies: Is the content posted
on the lawyer’s account a statement?
1. Retweets as Statements—Modern Examples
For attorneys who use social media sites such as Twitter, retweet-
ing other users’ information is common practice.147 For example, in
the spring of 2018, while posting multiple tweets advocating for his
position in Trump v. Hawaii, Neal Katyal retweeted links to articles
that supported his arguments.148
Practitioners and potential decision makers may also view
attorney tweets in the context of criminal cases. In Commonwealth
v. Cosby, District Attorney Kevin Steele retweeted a Rolling Stone
article about Cosby’s criminal acts only two months before filing
criminal charges against him.149 The article, which emphasized
words such as “dozens of women” and “Cosby” in bold, red typeface,
focused on Cosby’s criminal conduct, the women he harmed, and
Steele’s advocacy for obtaining justice for victims.150 Determining
whether the retweet was the attorney’s speech could have had real
implications in the Cosby case. The defense counsel presented the
court with a motion to disqualify Steele as prosecutor, due to, in
part, his retweet.151 Although the judge dismissed this motion in the
Cosby case,152 other cases reveal how displaying third-party content
on social media could impact whether a court considers the content
to be a lawyer’s own speech.
147. See supra note 6.
148. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
149. See Kevin Steele (@Steele4DA), TWITTER (Nov. 2, 2015, 6:23 PM), https://twitter.com/
Steele4DA/status/661368156724830208 [https://perma.cc/39E3-STTC]; see also Complaint,
Commonwealth v. William H. Cosby, Jr., No. CP-46-CR-0003932-2016 (Pa. Ct. C.P.,
Montgomery Cty., Crim. Div., filed Dec. 30, 2015).
150. Tara Murtha, Bill Cosby’s Fate Could Hinge on a Small-Town Election, ROLLING
STONE (Nov. 2, 2015, 5:28 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/bill-cosbys-
fate-could-hinge-on-a-small-town-election-65896 [https://perma.cc/327U-JQNY].
151. See Massoglia, supra note 9.
152. Foti, supra note 9.
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2. Expressive Conduct as Speech—Retweeting on Twitter
The U.S. Supreme Court has altered its conception of free speech
over time.153 The Constitution not only protects pure speech, but
also expressive conduct.154 To decide whether a person’s conduct is
significantly expressive, a court must apply the Spence test to de-
termine whether (1) a person intends to convey a message and
(2) that message is likely to be understood by others.155 Using the
Court’s Spence test, lower courts have analyzed whether a user’s
retweets and likes on social media are considered speech.156
Circuit courts have held that an individual’s Facebook “like”
constitutes speech.157 Scholars have suggested that “retweeting” a
post on Twitter is analogous to “liking” a page on Facebook.158
Retweeting a post places another user’s words on one’s own Twitter
account.159 In applying the Spence test to retweets, a court could find
that the user who retweeted a statement intended to convey a
message with which she agrees and accepts, because the message
will appear on her account.160 Additionally, viewers will understand
that the user is approving of the message.161 In applying the test, a
court would likely find that these retweeted statements are the
153. See Ira P. Robbins, What Is the Meaning of “Like”?: The First Amendment Implications
of Social-Media Expression, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 127, 130 (2013).
154. See id.
155. See id. at 134, 145; Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (per curiam).
156. See, e.g., Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Yassin,
No. 16-03024-01-CR-S-MDH, 2017 WL 1324141, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2017).
157. See, e.g., Bland, 730 F.3d at 386 (explaining that in liking a political candidate’s
Facebook page, “[t]he distribution of the universally understood ‘thumbs up’ symbol ...
conveyed that [the individual] supported [the politician’s] candidacy”).
158. Bethany C. Stein, Comment, A Bland Interpretation: Why a Facebook “Like” Should
Be Protected First Amendment Speech, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 1255, 1276-77 (2014).
159. Id. at 1277.
160. See id.
161. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974) (per curiam).
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user’s own speech.162 A district court ruled exactly this way in
United States v. Yassin.163
In Yassin, the court analogized a Facebook “like” with a Twitter
“retweet” in holding that a jury could find that a retweet constituted
the defendant’s endorsement of a true threat.164 In that case, the
defendant was charged with making threats to FBI agents on
Twitter.165 Yassin argued that she could not be held liable for the
retweets because she was not the person who wrote the threatening
language.166 In assuming that Yassin shared the statement,167 the
court analyzed the retweet as expressive conduct.168 The court noted
there is a general understanding that by sharing another user’s
post, the defendant agreed with the tweet, and viewers would
understand the user as agreeing with the tweet.169 The court further
noted that the retweet could be understood as pure, or “substan-
tive,” speech because the words, regardless of where they came
from, appeared on the defendant’s account and, therefore, could be
perceived as her own words.170 Ultimately, although the defendant
simply shared another person’s statement, the court found the
162. But see Anne Johnson, The Ethics of Retweeting and Whether It Amounts to En-
dorsement, NPR (July 31, 2014, 5:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/ombudsman/2014/
07/31/336921115/the-ethics-of-retweeting-and-whether-it-amounts-to-endorsement [https://
perma.cc/3NNQ-XRU3]; PJ Vogt, A Retweet Can Send You to Jail, a Like Is Free Speech,
WNYC STUDIOS (Sept. 19, 2013), https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/retweet-can-send-you-jail-
free-speech [https://perma.cc/P4LJ-GGBY] (explaining that retweeting a statement about a
user’s sick grandmother is not an endorsement of her illness).
163. No. 16-03024-01-CR-S-MDH, 2017 WL 1324141, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2017).
164. Id.
165. Id. at *2.
166. See id. at *5.
167. There was a discrepancy over whether Yassin retweeted the statement from another
person’s account or wrote the words herself. Id. This is because Yassin used the “old fashioned
way” to retweet, by simply posting “RT” at the beginning of her tweet, copying and pasting
the shared words to her account, and using the “@” symbol to link to the original poster’s
account. See Ray Beckerman, Retweet the Old Fashioned Way, Using ‘Classic’ or ‘Traditional’
Retweets Only, RAY’S 2.0 BLOG (Sept. 3, 2013, 11:09 AM), http://rays20.blogspot.com/2010/06/
traditional-retweet-tr-key-to.html [https://perma.cc/SN6V-XSM8]. Twitter does not endorse
this type of retweeting, suggesting instead that people use the “Retweet Icon.” Retweet FAQs,
TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/retweet-faqs [https://perma.cc/PGP5-VW
G2].
168. See Yassin, 2017 WL 1324141, at *5.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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statement to be the defendant’s speech, subject to a true threats
analysis.171
Courts have determined that likes and retweets are statements
for the purposes of analyzing a person’s free speech claim.172
Because courts have viewed retweets as a user’s own statements in
this context, a court likely would consider that a retweet is a
statement for the purpose of Rule 3.6 as well. Yet as technology
advances, courts will likely have to continue to consider whether an
attorney’s conduct on social media counts as a “statement” when
analyzing a lawyer’s online speech.
B. Substantial Likelihood of Prejudice Analysis in the Online
World
As more attorneys create social media statements, courts must
consider whether the statements will substantially prejudice juries
or jury venires. A court’s application of Rule 3.6 and the Gentile
factors is not exhaustive enough to protect an attorney who makes
extrajudicial statements on social media.
1. Modern Examples of Rule 3.6 Applied to Online Statements
In some cases, challenges to an attorney’s online statements will
fail because the traditional Gentile analysis effectively balances
lawyer and state interests.173 For example, in State v. Polk, the
attorney’s tweets were not considered to substantially prejudice the
jury.174 There, the court considered the timing and content of the
statement to find that, although the attorney’s statements were
made directly before and during the trial, the tweets stated public,
factual information that was unlikely to substantially prejudice the
jury.175
Similarly, in United States v. Silver, the prosecutor’s statements
on the U.S. Attorney’s Office Twitter account did not satisfy the
171. See id. at *4-5.
172. See, e.g., Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 385-86 (4th Cir. 2013); Yassin, 2017 WL
1324141, at *5.
173. See Vance, supra note 21, at 387.
174. 415 S.W.3d 692, 694 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
175. Id. at 695-96.
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substantial likelihood of prejudice test.176 There, the court consid-
ered the content and the timing of the statements in making its
final determination.177 Ultimately, the court heavily relied on the
“nature of the proceedings” factor and concluded that because grand
jurors are allowed to have access to more information than a trial
juror, there was less likelihood that the attorney’s statements would
have substantially prejudiced the proceeding.178
The courts’ holdings in these cases suggest that judges can apply
the traditional Gentile analysis to online statements. However,
courts have not always protected attorney speech on the Internet.
In United States v. Bowen, the Department of Justice prosecuted
murder crimes that occurred in New Orleans following Hurricane
Katrina.179 In an attempt to excite the public about the case, two
prosecutors within the U.S. Attorney’s Office anonymously posted
comments about the murders on an online news article.180 The court
considered the totality of the evidence—the quantity, content, and
timing of the comments—in making its determination that the
statements were substantially likely to prejudice a jury venire.181
Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of the defendant in the case
and granted him a new trial, basing part of its decision on the
prosecution’s comments’ ability to substantially influence the jury
venire.182 The court analogized the online environment to a “carni-
val” and stated that the online statements were ferocious and
egregious attacks that created a “poisonous atmosphere” that could
taint the potential jury pool, even if the statements were not as
“overt” as statements released directly to the press.183
The Bowen court crossed the line by infringing on too much
attorney speech. Although the court noted that the online news
source was popular in the jurisdiction,184 the court did not consider
the effects of anonymity or the quantity of other comments in
176. 103 F. Supp. 3d 370, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
177. See id. at 378-79.
178. Id. at 376, 380.
179. 969 F. Supp. 2d 546, 550 (E.D. La. 2013), aff’d, 799 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2015), reh’g
denied 813 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2016).
180. Id. at 552.
181. Id. at 551.
182. Id. at 621-22, 627.
183. Id. at 575, 578, 617, 620.
184. Id. at 621.
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determining whether a juror would likely see and be influenced by
the attorneys’ statements.185
First, if multiple users commented on the articles, it is less likely
that a potential juror would even see the few comments left by the
anonymous attorneys. Additionally, it is important for courts to
consider anonymity in determining the substantial likelihood for
prejudice. One reason to limit an attorney’s speech during litigation
is to prevent attorneys, or skilled professionals who jurors perceive
as having expertise in the case, from influencing jurors.186 If a
potential juror does not know that an attorney made a comment,
then this concern is not raised, and there is less reason to restrict an
attorney’s speech. The fear that was settled in Gentile arises
again—that “totally innocuous statement[s] could be a violation” of
Rule 3.6.187 Although the lawyers in Bowen are not the most
sympathetic parties, one could see how the Gentile analysis fails to
adequately balance lawyer and defendant rights in the online world
by preventing more attorney speech than is justified by the rule.
2. Different Outcomes Based on the Perceptions of Access to
Information Online
The court’s ultimate conclusion in Bowen might have been
influenced by the fact that judges are skeptical of the “online
carnival type atmosphere” where attorneys are posting state-
ments.188 Judges may not thoroughly consider the technological
functions and capabilities of Internet sites that affect a juror’s
ability to perceive a lawyer’s online statement because judges are
likely to think that potential jurors can easily view attorney
statements online.
This perception is understandable, as scholars and practitioners
frequently warn attorneys of social media dangers. In recent years,
185. The court did consider the defendant’s anonymity to be a factor that damaged the
integrity of the judicial proceedings and the profession. Id. at 626. However, the court did not
consider anonymity when determining whether such statements would substantially influence
a juror. Id. Although the Government in an opposition memorandum requested that the court
consider the defendant’s anonymity as a fact that mitigated the likelihood of substantial
prejudice to a jury, the court refused to consider the fact for this purpose. Id.
186. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
187. Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 251 (7th Cir. 1975).
188. See Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 578.
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scholars have warned practitioners to be cautious when posting
online or engaging in discussions.189 Legal professionals tell law
students to use caution with regard to their social media presence
when applying for jobs and registering for the Bar.190 Even the ABA
has commented on social media interaction when addressing judges
specifically; one formal opinion noted that judges must not assume
that statements will stay private online.191
The ABA has warned that comments can be “disseminated to
thousands of people.”192 Other scholars have noted that one message
can be “broadcast ... to untold millions”193 in a “matter of seconds.”194
The ability to communicate quickly, without edits from a reputable
publisher, also creates the fear that more prejudicial information
may reach jurors’ eyes.195 A lawyer’s use of the vast, expansive
Internet is seen as an amplified way to influence and prejudice
jurors who are browsing through content on their social media
accounts.196
One blogger describes how one statement can gain great notoriety
on Twitter.197 Patrick Antinozzi notes that “at any moment” one
tweet can be seen “by thousands ... even millions” with a few simple
tricks of the trade.198 By using a hashtag, powerful imagery, and
engaging with other users who had more followers than him, his
tweet went “viral,” and was seen by many people who normally
would not have seen his statement.199 A judge who is aware of the
rhetoric surrounding online communications likely perceives a
189. Awsumb & Roby, supra note 139, at 34 (“Because any information posted using social
media ... can be easily spread to a large number of people, lawyers should be careful in their
social networking and online habits.”).
190. See, e.g., Kathryn Rubino, Law School Grads Agree: Social Media Is ‘Fair Game’ for
Employers, ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 16, 2017, 12:43 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/08/law-
school-grads-agree-social-media-is-fair-game-for-employers [https://perma.cc/HGF2-LHTX].
191. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 462, 1 (2013).
192. Id. at 2.
193. Preston, supra note 12, at 932.
194. Vance, supra note 21, at 381.
195. See id. at 379-80.
196. See id. at 383-84.
197. See Patrick Antinozzi, How One Tweet I Posted Was Seen by Over 150,000 People,
RAPIDWEBLAUNCH BLOG (Jan. 5, 2017), https://blog.rapidweblaunch.com/2017/01/05/how-get-
noticed-twitter [https://perma.cc/87NC-7568].
198. Id.
199. Id.
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lawyer’s online statement as being more influential, and therefore
more dangerous to a proceeding.
3. Limiting Lawyer Speech Online Because of Perceptions About
the Spread of Information Across the Internet
This ideology affected attorneys’ speech interests in other cases
where judges appeared skeptical about granting lawyers more
speech rights when they posted their statements online. In United
States v. Koubriti, the court placed a gag order on the parties after
indicting defendants who had been on the terrorist watchlist after
9/11.200 Despite the order, the prosecution continued to make
statements to the press and post statements online.201 While the
jurors were subject to extensive voir dire that ensured they had not
been subjected to the attorney’s statements, the court held that the
attorney’s statements were likely to prejudice the jury, in part,
because electronic statements “could very easily have been inadver-
tently discovered by one of the jurors in the case” and “jurors’
families and friends [could] happen upon the improper comments
and mention them to a juror in [the] case.”202
Without further analysis to determine where the attorney posted
the statement and how available those statements were to public
eyes, the court seemed to presume that online statements could
easily reach potential jurors and influence proceedings.203 By
functioning under this presumption, courts limit more attorney
speech than is necessary to protect the states’ interest of a fair and
just proceeding.
Another example that affected a lawyer’s online speech is Jackson
v. Deen.204 There, the defense attorney for Paula Deen filed a motion
to disqualify the plaintiff’s attorney because the attorney posted
opinionated Twitter comments calling the defendant a racist and
sexist during the litigation.205 While the court refused to disqualify
200. 305 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
201. Id. at 729-30, 738.
202. Id. at 738.
203. See id. at 738, 744.
204. See No. CV412-139, 2013 WL 1911445, at *1, *3 (S.D. Ga. May 8, 2013).
205. Id. at *1, *3, & n.11.
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the attorney from the case, the court ruled that the tweets preju-
diced the proceeding.206
Analyzing the content of the tweets, the court found that the rude
opinions could cause potential jurors to treat the defendant in a
negative manner.207 However, the court failed to analyze this
information in light of the attorney’s Twitter account details.208 The
attorney raised the issue that he had a limited number of Twitter
followers.209 Because he had so few Twitter followers, it was likely
that only a few people saw his tweet.210 Therefore, the probability of
a potential juror “inadvertently discover[ing]” the tweet while on
social media was low.211
In Jackson too, the court presumed that a lawyer’s online
statement was more likely to reach potential jurors than a state-
ment made to the traditional media.212 Ultimately, these perceptions
make it less likely that a lawyer’s online statements will be
protected because judges will think that a lawyer’s online statement
will spread more rapidly and reach more people. However, this is
almost never the case.213
4. The Reality of Online Access and Distribution
It is extremely difficult for information to spread on certain online
media. Cumulatively, Twitter users tweet over 500 million tweets
per day.214 The chance of having one tweet noticed out of 500 million
is very small.215 There are certain ways users of this particular
medium spread information.216 To spread a tweet, a user can
increase his number of followers, post tweets that are emotional,
tweet often, use a distinctive voice, post at busy times, use popular
206. Id. at *3.
207. See id. at *1, *3.
208. See id. at n.11.
209. Id.
210. See infra Part III.C.2.
211. United States v. Koubriti, 305 F. Supp. 2d 723, 738 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
212. See 2013 WL 1911445 at *3 & n.11; Vance, supra note 21, at 383-84.
213. See infra Parts II.B.4-III.
214. Robert Wynne, Why It’s So Hard to Go Viral, FORBES (July 31, 2017, 4:46 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwynne/2017/07/31/why-its-so-hard-to-go-viral/ [https://
perma.cc/2U9N-H67M].
215. See id.
216. See Thornburg, supra note 1, at 299.
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hashtags, interact with other users via mentions and retweets, and
promote his Twitter account on other platforms.217 Scholars and
users of the medium have noted that it is particularly difficult for a
statement to spread across the medium—as “[e]ven prolific judicial
tweeters may not get much [of a] visible reaction.”218
Patrick Antinozzi admits that he had to work hard so that his
tweet could reach multiple audiences across Twitter.219 While his
hashtag and the content of the tweet itself resulted in the distribu-
tion to a handful of his nonfollowers, it was not until Antinozzi took
an additional assertive step and “mentioned” influential users (by
asking them to retweet his tweet) that his statement went viral.220
Even with his relative success in distributing his idea on Twitter,
Antinozzi admits that he was lucky and could never predict whether
a tweet would go viral.221
Although a lawyer’s statement does not need to go viral for it to
influence a jury venire, it seems that the statement must spread
beyond a lawyer’s direct “friends” or “followers” because a potential
juror probably is not interested in the lawyer’s day-to-day activities,
and therefore likely does not follow the lawyer on social media.222
Thus, using Twitter as an example, a statement would have to gain
enough popularity from followers to be retweeted to people who did
not directly follow the lawyer.223 As noted, it takes a concerted effort
for one statement to gain notoriety on social media.224 A court should
consider a social medium’s functions and a lawyer’s affirmative
actions, which can help limit a potential juror’s access to the
statement, when determining which online statements are likely to
substantially prejudice a trial.
217. Id. at 299-301.
218. Id. at 301; see also Antinozzi, supra note 197.
219. See Antinozzi, supra note 197.
220. See id.
221. Id.
222. The ABA prohibits attorneys and judges involved in litigation from “friending” or
“following” potential jurors. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op.
466, 4 & n.6 (2014). Lawyers may research jurors’ social media presences during the voir dire
process. Id. at 5. Judges can prohibit jurors from using social media during a trial, which
limits the likelihood that a juror will “follow” an attorney on social media. Id. at 6.
223. See id.
224. See supra notes 214-21 and accompanying text.
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III. ANALYZING NEW TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS
To determine whether an online statement is likely to substan-
tially prejudice a proceeding, courts must consider additional factors
that pertain to a medium’s technological abilities that could limit
the dispersal of an attorney’s message. This Part begins with an
analysis of the differences between online statements and state-
ments made in traditional media.225 Then, this Part analyzes factors
that will help guide judges to properly balance attorney and state
interests for statements made in the online forum.226 Finally, the
Part explains why these factors should be codified in a new com-
ment to Rule 3.6.227
A. The Old Factors Are Still Relevant
Before detailing the additional factors that courts should consider
when deciding a case that involves online statements, it is impor-
tant to note that the traditional Gentile factors should still be used
in a court’s determination.228 For example, in both United States v.
Silver and State v. Polk, the use of these factors in the online cases
helped the courts efficiently balance the attorney’s rights and the
states’ interests.229 However, the factors of intensity and frequency
must be reevaluated in the wake of online communication technolo-
gies.230
225. See infra Part III.A-B.
226. See infra Part III.C.
227. See infra Part III.D.
228. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1044 (1991) (noting that the attorney’s
statement was less likely to influence a jury that was impaneled six months after the
attorney’s press release); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2019).
229. See United States v. Silver, 103 F. Supp. 3d 370, 376, 379-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
(considering the factors of time and nature of the proceeding in the court’s analysis); State v.
Polk, 415 S.W.3d 692, 695-96 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (considering the factor of time in the court’s
analysis).
230. See, e.g., United States v. McGregor, 838 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1265 (M.D. Ala. 2012).
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B. Perceptions of Intensity and Frequency of Statements Must
Change
In Gentile, the Court referred to the intensity and frequency fac-
tors when describing the size of the community where the trial
would take place.231 The Court noted that with 600,000 potential
jurors residing within the trial court’s jurisdiction, it was unlikely
that all 600,000 would have been exposed to the attorney’s state-
ments in the newspaper and on television.232 Because of this, the
Court reasoned that “only the most damaging” statements would
have likely influenced the jury and the jury venire.233 Applying this
concept to an online social medium such as Twitter, the population
of potential jurors who have Twitter accounts will affect the like-
lihood of jury prejudice, because if the number of people in the jury
venire who do not use Twitter is large, then the likelihood that all
people in the jury venire will see a lawyer’s Twitter statement is
small.234
However, it is also important to note that the more prevalent a
statement’s publicity, the more likely it is that a potential juror will
see the statement and be influenced by it.235 Therefore, a court must
also consider how easy it is for a potential juror—who does not have
direct access to an online medium—to be inundated with an
attorney’s statement.
1. Frequency and Intensity in Old Media
When a statement is broadcast on local television channels and
radio stations, or published in local newspapers, an attorney’s
statement has the potential to reach multiple people in that
jurisdiction who are eligible for jury duty.236 By reading a local
231. See 501 U.S. at 1044.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See id.
235. See NAT’L CRIME VICTIM LAW INST., THE VICTIM’S ATTORNEY AND THE MEDIA: RULES
OF PROFESSIONALISM REGARDING EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS 2 (2017), https://law.lclark.edu/
live/files/25188-ncvli-newsletter-the-victims-attorney-and-the [https://perma.cc/PC3L-YXSK].
236. See, e.g., Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1045 (newspaper and television); United States v. Brown,
218 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2000) (television and radio); United States v. McGregor, 838 F.
Supp. 2d 1256, 1259 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (local newspaper and television).
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newspaper, watching the nighttime news, or listening to the radio
on the way to work, a juror could “inadvertently come upon” an
attorney’s statements about impending litigation without intending
to research the case.237
2. Frequency and Intensity in New Media
Yet a potential juror is less likely to be inadvertently inundated
with information found on social media.238 As the ABA has stated,
“many blogs, websites, and other electronic media are readily
accessible by anyone who chooses to access them.”239 Therefore,
turning on one’s television is not analogous to searching the web
because a potential juror must actively choose to search for an
attorney’s information.240 A story found in a “small local paper” is
“more prejudicial than a lot of publicity in a major market outside
... the venire pool.”241 The World Wide Web, with its wide reach,242
is more analogous to a market outside the court’s jurisdiction than
a local newspaper.
It is true that on social media, a potential juror’s connections with
other users may form an online community that looks more local in
nature. A person can view all posts and statements on their
“friends’” and “followers’” profiles, and many friends and followers
may be known by the user from his local community.243 However,
since it is unlikely that a potential juror “follows” or is “friends” with
an attorney before a case’s litigation, the likelihood of seeing the
attorney’s statement, even in a more localized social media setting,
is small.244
237. See United States v. Bulger, No. 99-10371-DJC, 2013 WL 3338749, at *6 (D. Mass.
July 1, 2013).
238. See supra Part II.B.
239. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 466, 1 (2014) (emphasis
added).
240. See id. at 1-2.
241. NAT’L CRIME VICTIM LAW INST., supra note 235, at 2.
242. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
243. See Boothe-Perry, supra note 49, at 134.
244. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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C. New Factors in a New Comment
If a potential juror does not follow an attorney, the likelihood of
that juror seeing the attorney’s statement is low, but not impossible.
This is why a judge must consider the following factors to effectively
determine whether an online statement will substantially influence
a jury or the jury venire.245 The ABA has recognized some of these
technological functions that control the public’s access to a user’s
online information; however, the factors have not been applied to
Rule 3.6.246 The following factors are presented in a manner that is
broad enough to apply to both current and future online communica-
tion technologies.247 These factors include: an attorney’s social-
media account privacy settings; an attorney’s number of followers;
the functions an attorney uses on a specific medium to make a
statement more searchable; and the ability of a potential juror to be
inundated with statements from nonfollowers.
1. Privacy Mode
A court should consider a lawyer’s privacy setting when determin-
ing whether his statements are likely to substantially prejudice a
proceeding. On Twitter, if a lawyer’s tweets are public, then the
attorney’s statements are visible to any Twitter user (if the user
searches for the attorney, or the statement is shared by someone
who the user follows), and to any researcher using a search engine
such as Google.248 A lawyer whose account is private only displays
his statements to “fellow subscriber[s],” or people who follow his
account on that social medium.249 If an attorney’s statements are
private, only people with whom he chooses to connect may view his
statements.250 Further, these “followers” cannot retweet, or share,
245. See infra notes 248-68 and accompanying text.
246. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 466, 2-3 (2014).
247. See Jessica Weltge & Myra McKenzie-Harris, The Minefield of Social Media and Legal
Ethics: How to Provide Competent Representation and Avoid the Pitfalls of Modern
Technology, 2017 ABA SEC. LAB. & EMP. L. ETHICS & PROF’L RESP. COMM. REP. 26-27.
248. About Public and Protected Tweets, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/safety-and-
security/public-and-protected-tweets [https://perma.cc/PD92-F87B].
249. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 466, 2 (2014); About Public
and Protected Tweets, supra note 248.
250. See About Public and Protected Tweets, supra note 248.
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the statements with their connections.251 This makes it significantly
less likely that a statement will spread across the online medium.252
If an attorney’s account is private, this factor weighs against the
statement’s substantial likelihood of prejudicing a proceeding.
2. Number of Followers
If a lawyer’s Twitter account is open for public viewing, a court
should consider how many people are following the lawyer’s
account.253 The more followers a lawyer has, the more likely that
statement will spread to other users as the lawyer’s followers
retweet the lawyer’s statement with their connections.254 Further,
Twitter’s algorithm influences which statements a follower sees and
subsequently shares.255 The more followers a lawyer has, the more
likely his or her statement will appear at the top of that follower’s
newsfeed.256 The higher the lawyer’s statement appears on a
follower’s newsfeed, the more likely that follower will engage with
the post and share it with his followers who may not directly follow
the lawyer’s account.257 In summary, a low number of followers
weighs against a substantial likelihood of prejudice, while a high
number of followers weighs in favor of there being a substantial
likelihood of prejudice.
3. Unsolicited Inundation
A court should review the online medium where the lawyer posted
his or her statement to determine how easy it is for a nonfollower to
view the lawyer’s statement. There are many ways to communicate
and spread information on social media.258 On Twitter, a user may
251. Id.
252. See Thornburg, supra note 1, at 255.
253. See id. at 298-99.
254. See id. at 300.
255. See Will Oremus, Twitter’s New Order: Inside the Changes that Could Save Its
Business—and Reshape Civil Discourse, SLATE (Mar. 5, 2017, 8:00 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/technology/cover_story/2017/03/twitter_s_timeline_algorithm_and_its_effect_on_us_
explained.html [https://perma.cc/C6D6-LCSE].
256. See id. 
257. See id.
258. For a review of Twitter’s communication functions and capabilities, see Thornburg,
supra note 1, at 254.
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see statements that are retweeted, or shared, even if the user is not
friends with the person who posted the original statement.259
Additionally, users enter into public debate more easily by posting
their statements with hashtags, which allow other users to easily
search Twitter and look at multiple users’ statements that refer to
the same, specific subject.260 A court should analyze these functions,
which are particular to the online medium, when determining
whether or not a statement is likely to influence a judicial proceed-
ing. The more sharing capabilities that are available on a medium,
the more likely it is that the statement could substantially prejudice
a proceeding.
4. A Lawyer’s Use of Technology in an Attempt to Inundate
Nonfollowers
A court must look not only to the sharing capabilities of a
particular online medium, but also to whether a lawyer uses the
available functions. For example, if a lawyer’s statement has been
retweeted multiple times and the lawyer uses a hashtag, there is an
increased likelihood that this statement will reach more people,
including potential jurors.261
The ability for a nonfollower to see a lawyer’s statements
increases with the use of Twitter’s algorithm.262 Twitter’s algorithm
no longer posts tweets chronologically on a user’s newsfeed.263
Certain statements appear at the top of a follower’s newsfeed, mak-
ing it more likely that a statement will be seen and shared across
the medium.264 The algorithm ranks multiple conditions to deter-
mine which statements appear at the top of a follower’s newsfeed.265
A lawyer who has numerous followers, uses inflammatory rhetoric,
tweets often, uses a distinctive voice, posts at busy times, uses
popular hashtags, and has multiple followers interacting with his
259. Id. at 300.
260. See id. at 255.
261. See supra Part III.C.3.
262. See Oremus, supra note 255.
263. Id. Before Twitter’s algorithm, statements were posted in reverse chronological order.
Id.
264. See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
265. See Oremus, supra note 255.
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tweet, is more likely to be featured on a follower’s newsfeed.266 If a
follower sees the attorney’s statement, then that follower can easily
retweet and share the post with that follower’s network (i.e., a
lawyer’s nonfollowers). Therefore, a lawyer’s use of these features
weighs in favor of a substantial likelihood of prejudice.
It is important to note that a social media site’s use of an
algorithm does not always weigh in favor of increasing the likeli-
hood of prejudice. An algorithm that incorporates a user’s prefer-
ences may actually keep a lawyer’s statement away from a potential
juror’s eyes if that potential juror expresses no interest in the law
or the criminal justice system on Twitter.267 The Twitter algorithm
gives each individual user a personal news-viewing experience by
showcasing posts that the user will be interested in at the top of the
user’s newsfeed.268 This “filter bubble” results in a user seeing only
what the user wants to see, rather than posts from users who have
differing viewpoints.269 Because the algorithm takes the user’s
preferences into account, the user may or may not see a lawyer’s
statement on Twitter. Any weighing of the factors must be consid-
ered in light of this information.
D. How the New Factors Help
Other scholars have proposed additional comments to the Rules
of Professional Conduct to resolve issues lawyers may face when
using the Internet and social media.270 While some courts may
already be using this Note’s proposed factors in determining
whether or not a lawyer’s online statement is likely to prejudice a
proceeding,271 codifying these factors in a new comment to Rule 3.6
could be beneficial for the following reasons.
266. See Thornburg, supra note 1, at 299-301; Oremus, supra note 255.
267. See Oremus, supra note 255.
268. See Thornburg, supra note 1, at 302; Oremus, supra note 255.
269. Oremus, supra note 255.
270. See Boothe-Perry, supra note 49, at 153 (analyzing Rule 1.6); Angela O’Brien,
Comment, Are Attorneys and Judges One Tweet, Blog or Friend Request Away from Facing
a Disciplinary Committee?, 11 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 511, 534 (2010) (analyzing Rule 3.5).
271. See Michael Downey, Ethical Rules for Litigating in the Court of Public Opinion,
A.B.A. (July 18, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/ethics/email/summer
2012/summer2012-0712-ethical-rules-litigating-court-public-opinion.html [https://perma.cc/
Y88P-MWJ2].
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First, implementing a comment to Rule 3.6 can help guide judges
across all jurisdictions. With codification, judges can look to one
place instead of sifting through persuasive case law from various
jurisdictions to determine whether a factor applied to a traditional-
media case can be effectively applied in the same way to an online-
media case.
Second, a more unified approach to considering extrajudicial
statements in an online world can give much needed guidance to
attorneys who seek to advocate for clients and express opinions
without violating their ethical obligations. By knowing which factors
the court will consider when determining whether a lawyer’s
statement has gone too far, a lawyer can preemptively take the
needed precautions to ensure his or her statement will not prejudice
a proceeding. Clearly defined factors have helped courts effectively
balance lawyer and state interests in the past.272 In the wake of
technological advancement, the addition of these new factors will
lead to the same result.
Two examples demonstrate why these factors can help courts
strike an appropriate balance between a lawyer’s speech interest
and a state’s interest in fair and just proceedings. First, assume, for
example, that Neal Katyal is a criminal defense attorney preparing
for trial in a local venue. Mr. Katyal decides to post tweets about the
ongoing litigation, referring to the arguments he will make during
trial.273 Using the proposed factors, a judge can easily rule that this
attorney’s statements are substantially likely to prejudice the jury.
The attorney’s tweets are not private.274 Therefore, his statements
may be shared with his followers and nonfollowers.275 Further,
Twitter’s algorithm is likely to feature Mr. Katyal—who posts often
and uses passionate language and hashtags in his tweets—on
followers’ newsfeeds.276 Lastly, because Mr. Katyal has over 200,000
followers, there is an increased likelihood that more followers will
like, comment on, and retweet his statement to their followers (i.e.,
272. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1034, 1036, 1044, 1046 (1991).
273. Cf. Neal Katyal (@neal_katyal), TWITTER (Apr. 9, 2018, 6:30 PM), https://twitter.com/
neal_katyal/status/983517554508468224 [https://perma.cc/9JHJ-SGRF] (“I’ll be arguing the
travel ban case .... An impt [sic] facet is the huge number of amicus ... briefs.... I’ll highlight
1 brief every day until then.”).
274. See supra Part III.C.1.
275. See supra Part III.C.1.
276. See supra Part III.C.3-4.
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Mr. Katyal’s nonfollowers).277 Mr. Katyal’s travel ban tweet that
promoted his upcoming argument received 236 retweets and 768
likes from Twitter users,278 making it more likely that the tweet
would be featured on the platform and spread to others.279 Such
factors weigh in favor of this attorney’s statement prejudicing
potential jurors who may be inundated with popular tweets on their
own social media accounts.
On the other hand, using these same factors, a judge could easily
rule that District Attorney (DA) Kevin Steele’s statements do not
substantially prejudice Bill Cosby’s jury trial.280 Assuming that Mr.
Steele retweeted the Rolling Stone article after litigation had
commenced, a judge could hold that DA Steele did not prejudice the
jury because the DA has few Twitter followers,281 and only two
people reacted to his tweet.282 Steele did not use any inflammatory
language or hashtags in retweeting the article.283 For these reasons,
Twitter’s algorithm likely would not feature this tweet on followers’
newsfeeds, and few people within the jury venue would have the
opportunity to see the statement.284 These factors weigh in favor of
allowing the attorney to speak on the issue because his speech will
not likely prejudice the jury venire.
IV. ADDRESSING COUNTERARGUMENTS
There are several counterarguments that suggest an additional
comment regarding technological factors protects too much attorney
speech at the expense of the state’s interests.
A. A Juror May Still See a Lawyer’s Online Statement
One counterargument could be that, despite analyzing a lawyer’s
followers, privacy settings, and use of sharing functions, a lawyer’s
277. See supra Part III.C.2.
278. See Neal Katyal (@neal_katyal), TWITTER (Apr. 9, 2018, 6:30 PM), https://twitter.com/
neal_katyal/status/983517554508468224 [https://perma.cc/9JHJ-SGRF].
279. See supra Part III.C.4.
280. See Steele, supra note 149.
281. See supra Part III.C.2.
282. See Steele, supra note 149; supra Part III.C.3-4.
283. See Steele, supra note 149; supra Part III.C.4.
284. See supra Part III.C.4.
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statements may still reach a potential juror. However, as the court
stated in In re Brizzi, a “court determines the likelihood that a
particular statement will cause prejudice at the time made, not
whether, in hindsight, it actually worked to the detriment of [the
adverse party].”285
Additionally, other procedural elements can aid in preventing an
extrajudicial statement from prejudicing a judicial proceeding. A
strong voir dire process enables lawyers to eliminate jurors who are
likely to research litigation online.286 Attorneys may ask potential
jurors specific questions about Internet usage, and attorneys are
encouraged to use the Internet to research jurors’ social media
presences prior to trial.287
Further, judges can issue jury instructions limiting or prohibiting
a jury member’s social media use throughout a trial.288 Lastly, in
extremely notorious cases with high publicity, judges can sequester
juries or transfer the cases to other venues to ensure that defen-
dants receive fair trials.289 These procedural protections further
ensure that a lawyer’s statements will not prejudice a jury.
B. A Lawyer’s Bad Speech May Not Be Sanctioned
One might also argue that these factors protect inflammatory
attorney speech.290 Even if a lawyer’s online statements are only
accessible to his followers and not likely to prejudice a jury, the
statements may still prejudice the state’s interests in protecting the
integrity of the court system. Although this is surely a legitimate
285. 962 N.E.2d 1240, 1245 (Ind. 2012).
286. Amanda McGee, Juror Misconduct in the Twenty-First Century: The Prevalence of the
Internet and Its Effect on American Courtrooms, 30 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 301, 317-18 (2009).
287. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 466, 3, 9 (2014);
McGee, supra note 286, at 317-18.
288. Amy J. St. Eve et al., More from the #Jury Box: The Latest on Juries and Social Media,
14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 64, 66 (2014) (“[J]ury instructions are the most effective tool to
mitigate the risk of juror misconduct through social media.”).
289. Andrew W. Lester, Media Mania: A Practical and Ethical Approach for Attorney
Contacts with Reporters 12 SPENCER FANE LLP (2017), https://www.spencerfane.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/Media-Mania-A-Practical-and-Ethical-Approach-for-Attorney-
Contacts-with-Reporters.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4KJ-CTEP].
290. See United States v. Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d 546, 621, 626 (E.D. La. 2013) (stating
that the misconduct is so “egregious” that a court should not consider prejudice).
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interest, this interest is not the main interest protected by Rule
3.6.291
Other Model Rules of Professional Conduct account for a lawyer’s
indiscretions. For example, Model Rule 8 describes a lawyer’s
ethical obligation to preserve the integrity of the judiciary.292
Furthermore, jurisdiction rules and firm policies may sanction an
attorney for statements made on social media.293 Although Rule 3.6
might not prevent all inflammatory or inappropriate online
statements from reaching community members, other rules
effectively proscribe such conduct.
C. The Rule May Limit a Judge’s Discretion
The last main counterargument related to the implementation of
a new technology-focused comment to Rule 3.6 is that implementing
this comment will limit a court’s discretion in determining whether
an attorney’s statement is likely to prejudice a jury. However, as can
be seen from the rule itself, the ABA has created and added
comments to the rule in the past to incorporate important factors a
court should consider in its determination.294
Courts have always considered multiple factors in weighing
attorney and state interests, using the totality of the evidence to
make their final determinations.295 Because courts already consider
different factors and weigh them against one another in making a
decision, the implementation of a few more factors will not likely
increase a court’s administrative burden.296 In an already fact-
specific, evidentiary inquiry, the consideration of additional factors
will help, not harm, the court’s ability to effectively assess an
attorney’s statements made in an online setting.
291. See supra Part I.A.1.
292. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019); Preston, supra note
12, at 961-74.
293. See, e.g., Preston, supra note 12, at 966-67 (describing Reed Smith’s social media
policy after an attorney posted offensive, inappropriate commentary online).
294. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmts. 1-7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
295. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 352-53 (1966).
296. See supra Parts I.C-D (discussing cases that perform the multifactor prejudice
analysis).
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CONCLUSION
The ABA has provided only limited guidance on how attorneys
can fulfill their ethical obligations when using the Internet.297
Although the Ethics Committee has met to address technological
changes, the Committee has done little to resolve attorneys’
impending concerns.298 Without proper guidance, attorneys must
continue “to bridge the gap between the existing rules of profes-
sional conduct and the ethical use of social media in the legal
profession.”299 The rising number of reported ethical violations
relating to social media use suggests that something more must be
done to protect both attorney and state interests.300
Rule 3.6 enables courts to effectively balance state and attorney
interests. However, the rule, in its current state, does not protect a
lawyer’s statements in an online setting. Rather, the rule leaves
open the potential for a lawyer to be sanctioned—merely because
the statement is posted in an online forum—even if the statement
is not substantially likely to prejudice a judicial proceeding.
Attorneys need clearer guidance than the generalized cautionary
message provided in Comment 8 of Rule 1.1301 to advocate for clients
while still fulfilling their ethical obligations. By considering new
technology-specific factors, such as an attorney’s online privacy
settings and number of followers, the functions the attorney uses on
a specific medium to make a statement more searchable, and the
ability of a potential juror to be inundated with statements from
nonfollowers, the court can better determine whether a statement
is truly substantially likely to negatively impact a proceeding.
By using these new factors, courts can better tailor their decisions
to promote the expression of ideas relevant to the public while still
limiting the most salacious speech to protect the state’s interest in
a fair trial. With the additional guidance, courts can implement
297. Boothe-Perry, supra note 49, at 145.
298. Preston, supra note 12, at 881-82.
299. Weltge & McKenzie-Harris, supra note 247, at 4.
300. See Awsumb & Roby, supra note 139, at 33.
301. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“[A] lawyer
should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks
associated with relevant technology.”); Preston, supra note 12, at 886, 905.
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more uniform decisions that appropriately balance attorney and
state interests in an online setting.
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